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Health Care Financing Reform: A Socio-Economic Perspective
Lok Sang Ho*

Abstract
This paper reviews some of the recent literature and experiences in
healthcare reform in the light of the peculiarities of human nature. The
review suggests that successful healthcare financing reform boils down to
working out a cost/risk-sharing formula between government and citizens
that can effectively preserve the incentives for efficient utilization of
healthcare resources and for preventive care, while limiting the financial
risk of citizens. The paper will also address issues arising from aging and
redistributive concerns, as well as political and administrative feasibility.

1. Introduction
A recent paper by Sidorenko and Butler (2007) reviewed the various efforts
to provide health insurance among Asian Pacific countries. They cited
the WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (2001:21): “good
population health is a critical input into poverty reduction, economic
growth, and long-term development at the scale of whole societies.” But
health1 is also a crucial input in “household production,” which is the
economist’s jargon for the process of turning consumption goods and
services purchased in the market place into “consumption attributes,” such
as nutrition and sensory pleasure, that directly affect people’s well being. 2
According to many studies (Veenhoven, 1991, Peiro, 2006), health appears
to be an important determinant of happiness. 3 Gruber and Mullainathan
(2005) even found cigarette taxes conducive to happiness, and this
apparently is because cigarette taxes reinforce the commitment to quit
*
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1
Here health should refer to “functional health.” This is the flow of functionally healthy
time that an individual enjoys within a specific time period. Duffy and MacDonnald(1990)
investigated into the determinants of functional health for the elderly.
2
One of the pioneers of the household production concept is Becker. See Becker(1965).
3
Causality is however notoriously difficult to establish. For example, one authoritative
result shows that happiness is inversely related to hypertension (Blanchflower and Oswald,
2007). One may ask if it is hypertension that make people less happy, or whether unhappy
people develop hypertension.
1

smoking, and ultimately contribute to a healthier and happier life for
smokers over the longer run.
Today the healthcare systems in many countries are facing a crisis. The
crisis facing Americans is well known and attracted even more debate after
Michael Moore’s controversial movie Sicko. Even the often-touted
Singapore system had to cope with emerging problems with various
reforms, which over time have added to the complexity of the system
considerably (Taylor et.al. 2003). Thus, on top of the better known
Medisave, which was launched in 1984, a catastrophic insurance scheme
called Medishield was introduced in 1990 to serve as a risk management
tool, protecting the insured from excessive burden in the event a major
illness struck. To ensure the sustainability of Medishield, Singapore
requires of patients payment in the form of deductibles and co-payments,
and sets limits over claims per treatment, per policy year, and over one’s
life time. Singapore introduced the Medifund to assist the poor in 1993,
and stipulated that only the interest proceeds from the endowment fund
were to be used to help the eligible poor. Singapore further introduced
the Eldershield in 2002 to provide protection against the risk of severe
disabilities when one gets old. In Hong Kong, alarm had been raised time
and again that the government-funded healthcare system is unsustainable
(Hsiao et.al. 1999). On the Chinese Mainland, where government
funding for healthcare is minimal and hospitals are asked to procure its
own finances through fees and charges, considerable anxiety pervades the
population over unpredictable and often large medical expenditures (Liu
and Mills, 2002; French, 2006), putting great pressure to reform the system.
Across the Taiwan Strait, the introduction of a National Health Insurance
plan in Taiwan was welcomed by the population, but had raised concern
about sustainability and moral hazard problems,4 while the co-payme nt
requirements also had raised concern about fairness (Cheng, 2003). 5
The fact is, there is a dilemma that faces most universal health insurance
schemes or national health systems. It is human nature that people are
worried about great financial risks. But if patients are protected from the
bulk of the cost when health services are required, it is also human nature
that they will lose some motive for preventive care and will tend to
4

Moral hazard is a term used in the insurance literature to describe how people respond to
insurance by taking less preventive care(demand side moral hazard) or by providing more
services than is appropriate(supply side moral hazard).
5
Critics argue that the sick are already disadvantaged and often poor and should not be
burdened with copayments.
2

over-utilize the system (“demand side moral hazard”). Furthermore,
when caregivers are asked to bill the insurance fund for the care they give
to patients they may give more “care” than necessary (“supply side moral
hazard”) and they may even bill it for care not given. 6 Although there is
little dispute that governments should provide a safety net to the needy, in
an aging society, it is important that people should be motivated to take
care of themselves and to save for their healthcare needs7 at an early age
by arousing their cost consciousness. The kind of universal health
insurance as we know to date 8 however blunts that cost consciousness,
raising the possibility of a cost explosion in the future when people grow
old. The tendency for diabetes and obesity cases to develop among the
younger population as observed in many countries is particularly
worrying. 9
Section 2 will explore the reasons why healthcare reform has been so
difficult and why many efforts at reforming healthcare have failed.
Section 3 will discuss the key elements of a successful healthcare policy.
Section 4 provides an argument for the public healthcare sector to cover
only “basic care,” to implement marginal cost pricing for such services,
and for the government to negotiate standard pricing for basic drugs with
pharmaceutical companies, while leaving premium services and premium
drugs entirely to the market. Section 5 discusses a modified version of
Ho’s Excessive Burden Insurance (Ho, 1997) designed specifically to
address the aging issue. Section 6 will discuss the concept of Lifetime
Healthcare Supplement, which can go hand in hand with Excessive Burden
Insurance to increase the choices available to citizens without exposing the
government itself to excessive financial risk. Section 7 looks into the
subject of political and administrative feasibility, which inevitably will
include distributive justice concerns. Section 8 concludes the paper by
observing that the key to successful healthcare reform lies in defining the
roles of private and public caregivers in a way that reflects their
comparative advantages and in combining the best features of a
market-oriented system and those of a public healthcare system.

6

“Care” in quotation marks to highlight the fact that it may not be in the patient’s interest at
all. While living in Canada in the 70s the author read of multiple news reports about such
fraudulent claims.
7
We will argue that they should save for part of their healthcare needs when they get old.
This is the “affordable share” of their healthcare cost. See below.
8
Typically these are in the form of “Fee Reducing” insurance. See Appendix for a
comparison with Excessive Burden Insurance.
9

See Daviglus et.al.(2004) & http://www.diabetes.org/diabetes-research/summaries/daviglus-bmi.jsp
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2. Health Policy as a Socio-Economic and a Political Problem
Many efforts at healthcare reform have failed because they fail to
recognize the peculiarities of human nature, particularly people’s natural
incentives and extreme risk aversion (psychological/ economic) and the
peculiarities of the healthcare and insurance markets (economic),
Pressured by different interest groups (political) and worried over
implications on the public purse (economic), policy makers have often
failed to build in features in the policy that directly address the incentive
problem and the human need for peace of mind. (Ho, 1998, 2001b, 2006).
A sustainable and high quality healthcare system requires providing the
right incentives among all key stakeholders and getting the cooperation of
all parties concerned. Unfortunately, typically this is rendered very
difficult because of political reasons. Politicians may be wary of
introducing cost-based user charges that may turn their voters away.
They figure that voters will take the short view rather than the long view.
Their own time horizon, too, seldom extends beyond one or two terms of
office. Then there are insurers, pharmaceutical companies, private
doctors, lawyers, and others who are eager to defend or further their
interests, all rendering a fair, longer term solution to the health policy
problem “academic.”10
Although public policy affects different stakeholders differently, it is
possible to have a workable definition of “the public interest.” Following
Rawls (1971) and Ho (2001) we propose that the public interest is the ex
ante interest of the “representative individual” as he confronts different
possibilities: the representative individual being a hypothetical individual
who faces equal probability of being anyone within the society. We may
perform a thought experiment as suggested by Rawls (1971). Imagine
that we could be a doctor; a healthy person or a patient; the shareholder of
a pharmaceutical company; the shareholder of an insurance company; or
someone not holding any stake in these companies; a rich person or a
person of poor means; a fortunate one, or an unfortunate one: with
probabilities equal to the percentage of these different people in the
community. We would ask, as we ponder over each policy proposal: if we
were “behind a veil of ignorance” about our identity (Rawls, 1971), which
10

“The pharmaceutical and health products industry has spent more than $800 million in (US)
federal lobbying and campaign donations at the federal and state levels in the past seven
years.” See “Drug Lobby Second to None How the pharmaceutical industry gets its way in
Washington”,
The
Centre
for
Public
Integrity,
posted
July
7,
2005.
http://www.publicintegrity.org/rx/report.aspx?aid=723 accessed August 10, 2007.
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policy option would we prefer? Thus public interest is the interest of
society when vested interests are forgotten: there is no specific person or
party to fend for or to please, but there is a need to fend for and to care for
anyone in society in a probabilistic sense.
Various surveys on the two sides of the Atlantic and elsewhere have shown
that people are all deeply concerned about healthcare (Blendon, et.al., 1990;
Mossialos, 1997, Blendon and Benson, 2001, Peiro, 2006) and
unpredictable healthcare costs. Various polls in China have indicated that
healthcare and healthcare cost are one of the key concerns of the
population. Providing reliable needed care at an affordable cost is clearly
conducive to happiness and deserves high priority in the social agenda in
most countries.
Understandably, many governments are worried about the rising burden of
healthcare on the public purse. However, while sustainability is a
legitimate concern, a rise in the share of healthcare spending in GDP does
not necessarily signal any problem, and may simply reflect the changing
needs of society. To control costs, many governments look upon the
Singapore healthcare system as a model, as it demonstrably has succeeded
in containing public expenditures on healthcare. But with so many rules
and restrictions all of which limit choice and potentially welfare, the
Singapore model may not be the best option.
The task facing a government concerned with maximizing the public
interest is the daunting one of seeking the best deal for the representative
individual while facing the fight to promote self interest by different
interest groups: from patient and consumer groups to doctors and HMOs
to insurance companies and lawyers to pharmaceutical companies and their
shareholders. This paper argues that the government needs to define its
role narrowly as providing just “basic care” at affordable cost, while
leaving the market to take care of “premium care” as long as proper
standards and accountability are maintained. Defining what is covered
under “basic care” will limit the cost exposure of the government and will
give private players maximum room to play out their different roles
without fear of unfair competition from the public sector. Politically, by
allowing pharmaceutical companies to charge market prices for “premium
care” drugs, there is a better chance for the government to be able to
negotiate affordable drug prices on the “basic care” list.

5

The essence of healthcare financing reform, from this perspective, boils
down to defining the role of the government appropriately and to working
out a cost/risk-sharing formula between the government and the citizen that
can effectively preserve the incentives for efficient utilization of healthcare
resources and for preventive care, and thus to ensure sustainability.
3. Key Elements of Reform
Economists know well that correct pricing holds the key to economic
efficiency. 11 Common folks know well that the dilemma of having to pay
beyond one’s means or facing the serious consequences of substandard or
inadequate care is the source of much agonizing both for the patient and
for his immediate family members. Recent analysis by Ho (2001, 2006)
further suggests that the prospect of having to face such a dilemma has an
immediate negative effect on happiness. 12 Thus any viable healthcare
financing package should include:
(1) a pricing policy that ensures fees and charges reflect marginal or
direct costs of services;
(2) an insurance mechanism that ensures that patients never have to face
the dilemma of either going broke or going without proper healthcare
at a time when such care is crucial to preserving health or even
survival.
Apart from these basic considerations, providing more choice is assumed
to be superior to providing less choice, unless the choices become
confusing and lead to disorientation (Schwartz, 2004),. Thus there is:
(3) an imperative to increase choices as long as the benefit of increasing
choices exceeds the cost. Finally,
(4) resources should be allocated into healthcare as long as the additional
benefit exceeds the cost. This is true for the government as well as
for the individual. An appropriate amount of public revenue should be
allocated for the prevention of illnesses and accidents, for the
treatment of patients, for the training of healthcare professionals, and
for research and development. Cost benefit analysis needs to be
performed to assess how much of each is optimal. At the individual
level, as long as prices are appropriate, we can leave the individual to
make his own choice, unless a particular kind of behavior has

11

Economic efficiency means simply making the most out of what is available. It requires
producing at the least cost, allocating resources according to people’s choices, and
consumption efficiency.
12
This is called “prospective happiness.”
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significant external effects on others, in which case government
regulation will be necessary.
While most countries continue to see an increase in the share of resources
being devoted to healthcare there is evidence of wastefulness and
inadequate resources being allocated to healthcare at the same time for
many countries. In China, doctors supplement their meager incomes by
overcharging patients through drug sales or unnecessary services and
procedures so as to obtain bonuses. The practice is encouraged by hospitals
which are under-funded by the government and need extra income to make
ends meet (Blumenthal, 2005). Because lucrative fees can be charged on
high-end services, Chinese hospitals over-invest in costly medical
equipment, such as Comp uterized Tomography machines— the 30.6%
ownership rate is even higher than that in major European cities and the
US (IBM, 2006).
4. Marginal Cost Pricing for Basic Care for Efficiency
It is important to distinguish between basic care and premium care.13 For
basic care, which is defined as the most cost-effective care to maintain
normal health given the constraint of sustainability and universal
accessibility, fees and charges need to be regulated and fixed at the
marginal cost (the direct cost arising from a service) of the care. This is
necessary to minimize both demand side and supply side moral hazard.
In general, charging below marginal cost may lead to waste and demand
beyond what is optimal. This is well documented by the famous Rand
Health Insurance Experiment study (Newhouse, 1993). Charging above
marginal cost on the other hand makes providing a service profitable and
may lead to supply-side moral hazard. Given the importance of health
and the need for timely care patients and information asymmetry, patients
and their families tend to comply with suggestions made by their
caregivers, especially when they have few alternatives to choose. 14
It is suggested that governments should pay for all fixed/overhead costs of
basic care services, so that there will be no need for user charges to exceed
marginal costs. With charges covering direct costs, caregivers also will
13

This is crucially related to the question of public versus private provision, as pointed out by
Lim (2005). As well it is crucially related to the question of affordability: “the thought of
denying a fellow human being access to the same level of health care because of his or her
inability to pay, stirs deep emotions.”(p.461)
14
Ho(1995) has documented how lucrative fees and charges had caused inappropriate care
and waste in China. A more recent study(IBM, 2006) also drew the same conclusion.
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not undersupply services for financial reasons. Successful control of
supply-side moral hazard is an important reason why both the National
Health Service of the UK and the Hong Kong Hospital Authority system
are widely considered good value for money. In both healthcare systems
doctors as well as other healthcare professionals are paid a salary that
allows a reasonable return for their human capital investment. Salaried
doctors would not like patients to revisit unless there is a professionally
perceived need for it.
While the charges for basic care should be regulated and set equal to
marginal cost, the prices of premium services should be left entirely to the
market. By definition, patients opt for premium services and they do so
only when they perceive good value. The government should not only
leave premium care pricing alone, but should also avoid competing with
private caregivers in providing such services. It is unfair for the
government, which has the authority to tax, to compete with private
caregivers for profitable business. When suppliers of healthcare services,
including pharmaceutical companies, are thus allowed to earn more for
premium services rendered, they will be in a better position to agree to
concessionary pricing for “basic care” products and services. Moreover,
they will be in a better position to engage in research and development, and
further improve their premium services.
While public hospitals and clinics should not compete directly with them
for profitable business, private healthcare providers should be allowed and
even encouraged to offer basic care services. But if their services are
truly “basic” they should follow the government’s pricing scheme. For
such caregivers, since they are helping the government and are alleviating
the public burden to fund healthcare infrastructure it may be argued that
the government should provide some lump sum grants to defray part of
their overhead costs.
5. Excessive Burden Insurance for Protection
If the public is worried about healthcare being excessively burdensome,
then the universal Excessive Burden Insurance (Ho, 1997, 2001a) appears
to be a logical policy response. The idea of public healthcare based on an
annual deductible has been implemented in Sweden, where a patient who
has paid a total of SEK 900 in patient fees from the date of the first
consultation is entitled to free medical care for the rest of a twelve-month
period (Fact Sheets on Sweden, 2003, Swedish Institute). But there the
8

fees as well as the annual deductible appear too low to serve the purpose of
healthcare financing or that of moral hazard control. Excessive Burden
Insurance is an insurance scheme in the sense that each citizen is protected
or “insured” against having to spend beyond his means in some sense.
Under Excessive Burden Insurance the insured person pays the direct cost
for services consumed up to a pre-set annual limit which is considered a
fair and bearable contribution by the patient. Beyond this “annual
deductible” the government will offer complete protection for basic care.
Of course, the coverage of basic care needs to be carefully defined. Under
an EBI insurance, premi ums may either be collected from the public
individually or entirely paid for by the government. Excessive Burden
Insurance distinguishes itself from most national health insurance schemes
in that, before the pre-set annual limit has been reached, citizens are
expected to pay the direct cost of healthcare services. A problem with
many national health insurance plans is that they mitigate the incentive of
citizens to take preventive care and that the effective under-pricing of
health services often leads to waste and abuse. Under Excessive Burden
Insurance waste and abuse are minimized while any revenue collected
through user charges is recycled back into basic healthcare. Although
beyond the pre-set limit all cost is absorbed by the government it is argued
that those citizens who utilize health services so intensively are likely to
have a good reason.
Table 1 and Table 2 in the Appendix provide a numerical illustration to
show that in order for a “fee-reducing” insurance program, which is typical
of most national health insurance schemes, to significantly reduce the risk
exposure to patients, as Excessive Burden Insurance does, the discount off
the actual cost of medical care is likely to be as high as 90%. This kind of
discount, however, would significantly distort the perception of costs and
will cause serious moral hazard.
Finally, it is a well known fact that older people generally use healthcare
services much more than younger people, although there can be a great
variation from country to country (Hagist and Kotlikoff, 2005).15 To be
fair to everybody and to encourage saving and a healthy life style at a
young age, the annual pre-set limit (the annual “deductible”) should be
raised for those beyond the age of 50 by some specific amount each year
up to some socially agreeable amount. Such arrangement would enable
the government to collect more revenue that can be recycled back to the
public healthcare system to provide timely quality healthcare for the aged.
15

Their Table 2 is reproduced as Table 3 in the Appendix.
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Considering the fact that the healthcare expenditure-age profile has
actually steepened following the introduction of a new health insurance
law in 1996, and that a similar steepening has been observed in many other
countries (Steinmann et.al. 2007), making people aware of the high cost of
healthcare if their health should decline significantly when they get old
may be the crucial step necessary to prevent the expansion of morbidity as
discussed in Olshansky et. al. (1991)
6. Lifetime Healthcare Supplement (LHS) for Greater Choice
While conceptually “basic care” is “the most cost-effective care to
maintain normal health” defining the boundary between basic care and
premium care is not entirely a scientific exercise. It depends on the
expectations of the community, as well as the readiness of the community
to fund healthcare. Presumably, if the annual deductibles are higher, the
government will collect more revenue from patients. The coverage of
basic care can be broader.
In general, because care using the latest technology is usually very costly,
the community may not be able to afford including certain expensive
treatments/drugs as basic care, even if they are proven effective in
restoring normal health/functioning.
Addressing this concern, the
Lifetime Healthcare Supplement (LHS) is proposed as a cost-sharing
arrangement to offer patients the opportunity to take advantage of these
latest advances in medical knowledge with assistance, while limiting the
cost exposure to the government.
Under this arrangement, the
government will set aside some contingent funds for each member of the
community in a LHS account in his name. Patients can draw funds from
this account to pay for any form of care as he sees fit, but they must match
the withdrawals with their own funds according to a stipulated ratio.
Moreover, since the funds put up by the government is fixed for the
lifetime of each individual, if a patient draws funds now, he will have less
available in the future. Thus the lifetime fixed amount caps the
contingent cost to the government and in addition helps preserve the
incentive to use the resources wisely. The matching requirement is like a
co-payment in insurance to reduce moral hazard problems. Because of
the matching requirement and the availability of Excessive Burden
Protection for basic care, only a fraction of the community will ever draw
funds. In addition it is also likely that cumulative lifetime withdrawals in
the end will not exhaust the funds in the account. What proportion of the
population will draw funds from their LHS accounts and what proportion
10

of the funded amounts will be withdrawn are empirical questions that will
be answered with experience.
7. Political and Administrative Feasibility
The suggestion that basic health care fees should be based on direct costing
and that the annual deductible should rise from age 50 raises worry that it
may not be politically feasible. This is on top of the worry that it might
undermine access to care or might cause costly delays in getting care.
These are valid concerns and need to be addressed.
To mitigate the affordability problem under excessive burden insurance, 16
discounts on fees and reduced annual deductibles may be given those
found to be poor. Moreover, for those who are receiving welfare
payments, an increase in their mo nthly stipends may go hand in hand with
charging them a reduced fee. The increase in the welfare stipend can in
principle reduce the net increase in burden to as small as is desired.
With the affordability issue taken care of, and with the promise of better,
more timely and more reliable services in the offing, and on top of that
with the offer of the Lifetime Healthcare Supplement— there is a good
chance that political feasibility will not be a problem.
Administratively the proposal is easy to implement especially in light of
today’s information technology. Indeed Sweden has been implementing
some kind of excessive burden protection for over a decade. The
proposed system will require setting up a separate central file for each
eligible citizen. Under this file will be recorded his medical history,
blood type, what he is allergic to, as well as his “basic care” medical
spending within the year. The system will be automatically alerted when
he has paid up his annual deductible. From that time on till the end of the
year the government will be responsible for all his basic care medical
expenditures.
The public healthcare system will provide basic healthcare only and will
announce official basic care charges from time to time. Private caregivers
16

Bundorf and Pauly(2006) found evidence that in the US one quarter to 3/4 of the uninsured
can actually “afford” but did not choose to get coverage. Perceived value for money, which
may be affected by the insured person’s own perceived health, will affect enrollment.
Without mandating health insurance, it is quite likely that some people will stay uninsured
even when it is subsidized.
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who opt to provide basic care will have to charge the same rates, but they
have the option to provide better than basic care and to charge more, as
well as to provide premium care. In the case where caregivers provide
better than basic care, only the official basic care charges will be recorded
as insurable expenditures. With authorization by the patient private
caregivers will have access to the central file and will record his “basic
care” expenses and treatment history as well. The patient’s central file
will therefore provide the basis of “seamless care” and will serve multiple
purposes, including epidemiological studies that can prove crucial to public
health.
8. Conclusions
Healthcare reform is on the agenda of almost every government. Social
scientists are in a unique position to inform policy makers in the reform
process. It is important that policy makers take full account of human
nature when they go about designing the reform package: the human
propensity to follow the natural course of incentives, the aversion to
extreme risks, and the preference for autonomy. If healthcare reform can
reduce the worries of citizens it will immediately contribute to the
happiness of the society. If rules and restrictions are minimized and
people are given a greater sense of autonomy when they conduct their lives
happiness will be enhanced. Reference to human nature will usually
reveal why some healthcare reform fails. Moral hazard is a case in point.
The challenge is to combine market-oriented options, which will make
people more cost-conscious, with public provision, which can reduce risk
and information cost and can better ensure quality, innovatively so that
healthcare reform works with rather than against human nature.
While many policy makers are right to be worried about containing costs, a
rising percentage of the GDP being spent on healthcare does not
necessarily signal a problem. It may simply reflect society’s new
priorities, changing demographics, and the latest advances in technology.
Sustainability, however, is a valid concern. One key reason why national
health insurance systems may not be sustainable is the demand-side moral
hazard problem caused by the under-pricing of key services and the
supply-side moral hazard problem caused by the profitability of rendering
services by caregivers.
Containing the moral hazard problem is
fundamental to achieving sustainability. Pricing “basic care” at or near
true marginal cost (direct cost) must be an important component of a
sustainable healthcare system. For premium care, to the extent that it is
12

consumed voluntarily and that it is provided by the free market without
subsidy, pricing should not be regulated.
Given the citizens’ concern for excessive burden, some form of excessive
burden protection is logical. To an extent this is already in place in many
countries. The Medishield in Singapore for catastrophic insurance is a
case in point. Excessive burden insurance as discussed in this paper,
however, is more flexible in that it covers not only specified illnesses but
all basic care expenses up to the yearly pre-set limit.
The idea of a high deductible health insurance plan is also already quite
well known, particularly in the United States, where High Deductible
Health insurance Plans (HDHPs) are often paired with a Health Savings
Account. 17 The purported advantages of such plans by way of reducing
the cost of insurance premiums and of reducing waste are also well known.
However, HDHPs have been criticized as undermining access to care and
as failing to cause a dent in the trend for rising health insurance premiums
(Davis, Doty, and Ho, 2005). Regarding access, a problem with the
American situation is that there is no regulation of basic care charges and
there is typically a co-payment of 20 per cent even after the deductible
amount. Because HDHPs account for only about 8% of all private
insurance plans it is not surprising that they do not have any noticeable
effect on overall costs. The observation that HDHP has effectively
reduced access suggests that it is effectively reducing utilization of health
services and should therefore reduce overall costs, provided that it is
widely used. Instead of the fear that HDHP may fail to reduce overall
costs, then, the fear is that it may be reducing warranted care.
To alleviate excessive burden for the poor and in order not to undermine
access, we have suggested that eligible persons passing a means test may
enjoy lower fees and lower annual deductibles. The appropriate discount
has to be determined through consultation and consensus, and may be
supplemented by a greater stipend for those who currently receive welfare
payments. Efficiency considerations dictate that no one should be totally
exempt from healthcare charges. Thus redistribution and resource
allocation are two different and equally worthy objectives and will require
two different policy instruments to achieve them.

17

Unlike the mandatory health savings accounts in Singapore, US Health Savings Accounts
are voluntary with contributions encouraged by tax advantages.
13

References
Bandorf M.K. and Mark Pauly (2006) “Is health insurance affordable for
the uninsured?” Journal of Health Economics, 25 (2006) 650–673.
Becker, Gary (1965) “A Theory of the Allocation of Time, Economic
Journal, September, 493-517.
Blanchflower, David G. and Andrew J. Oswald (2007) Hypertension and
Happiness across Nations NBER Working Paper No. 12934 February.
Blendon, Robert Leitman, Ian Morrison, and Karen Donelan (1990)
“Satisfaction With Health Systems In Ten Nations,” Health Affairs, 9 (2),
185-192.
Robert J. Blendon and John M. Benson (2001) “Americans’ Views On
Health Policy: A Fifty-Year Historical Perspective,” Health Affairs, 20 (2),
33-46.
Blumenthal, D. (2005) Privatization and Its Discontents – The Evolving
Chinese Health Care System. The New England Journal of Medicine. 355
(11): 1165-1170.
Cheng, Tsung-Mei (2003) “Taiwan’s New National Health Insurance
Program: Genesis And Experience So Far,” Health Affairs, 22 (3) 61-76.
Daviglus M.L., Liu K., Lijing L.L., et al (2004). “Relation of body mass
index in young adulthood and middle age to Medicare expenses in older
age.” Journal of American Medical Association, 22:2743-2749.
Davis, Karen, Michelle M. Doty, and Alice Ho (2005) “How High is Too
High? Implications of High Deductible Health Plans,” The Commonwealth
Fund, April.
Duffy, M.E. and E MacDonald (1990) “Determinants of functional health
of older persons,” The Gerontologist, Vol 30(4), 503-509.
French, Howard W. (2006) “Wealth Grows, But Health Care Withers in
China,” New York Times, January 14.

14

Gruber, Jonathan, and Sendhil Mullainathan (2005) “Do Cigarette Taxes
Make Smokers Happier?” Advances in Economic Analysis and Policy, 5 (1)
reprinted in Ng, Yew-kwang and Lok Sang Ho (eds. 2006) Happiness and
Public Policy: Theory, Case Studies, and Implications, Palgrave Macmillan,
109-146.
Hagist, Christian and Laurence J. Kotlikoff (2005) “Who’s Going Broke?
Comparing Healthcare Costs in Ten OECE Countries, NBER Working
Paper 11833.
Ho, Lok Sang (1995) “Market Reform and China's Health Care System,”
Social Sciences and Medicine, Vol. 41, no.8, October, pp.1065-1072.
Ho, Lok Sang (1997) Health Care Delivery and Financing: A Model for
Reform, City University of Hong Kong Press.
Ho, Lok Sang (1998) “A Model of Human Nature and Personal
Development,” Journal of Socio- Economics, Vol. 27, no. 2, 271-287.
Ho, Lok Sang (2001a) “Health Care Financing and Delivery in Hong
Kong: What Should Be Done,” Hong Kong Medical Journal, 7 (2), June
155-161.
Ho, Lok Sang (2001b) Principles of Public Policy Practice, Boston:
Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Ho, Lok Sang (2006) “The Three Happinesses and Public Policy,” in Yew
Kwang Ng and Lok Sang Ho (2006) (eds.) Happiness and Public Policy:
Theory, Case Studies, and Implications. Palgrave-Macmillan.
Hsiao, William, et.al. (1999) Improving Hong Kong's Health Care System :
Why and For Whom? Harvard Expert Team Analysis Report, April.
http://www.fhb.gov.hk/en/press_and_publications/consultation/HCS.HTM
accessed August 1 2007.
IBM Business Consulting Services (2006) Healthcare in China: Toward
Greater Access, Efficiency, and Quality.
Lim,M.K. (2005) “Transforming Singapore Health Care: Public-Private
Partnership,” Annals of the Academy of Medicine, Singapore
2005;34:461-7.
15

Liu Xingzhu and Anne Mills (2002). “Financing reforms of public
health services in China: lessons for other nations,” Social Science
&, Medicine, 54, 1691-1698.
Mocan, H. Naci, Erdal Tekin, Jeffrey S. Zax. The Demand for
Medical Care in Urban China, NBER Working Paper 7673, 2000.
Mossialos, Elias (1997) Citizens’ Views on Healthcare Systems in the 15
Member States of the European Union, Health Economics, 6: 109–116.
Newhouse, Joseph P. (1993) Free for All? Lessons from the RAND Health
Insurance Experiment, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Olshansky, S. J., M. A. Rudberg, B. A. Carnes, B. A. Cassel and J. A.
Brady (1991). “Trading off Longer Life for Worsening Health: The
Expansion of Morbidity Hypothesis,” Journal of Aging and Health, 3
(2):194–216.
Peiro, Amado (2006) “Happiness, Satisfaction, and Socio-economic
Conditions: Some International Evidence,” Journal of Socio-economics, 35,
348-365.
Rawls, John(1971) A Theory of Justice, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Schwartz, Barry(2004), The Paradox of Choice: Why More is Less, Ecco Books.
Sidorenko, Alexandra and James R. G.Butler (2007) Financing Health
Insurance in Asia Pacific Countries, Journal of Asian-Pacific Economic
Literature, 21(1), May, 34-54.
Steinmann, Lukas, Harry Telser, Peter S. Zweifel (2007) “Aging and
Future Healthcare Expenditure: A Consistent Approach,” Forum for
Health Economics & Policy, 10(2): 1-26.
Taylor, Rob and Simon Blair (2003) Financing Health Care: Singapore’s
Approach, The World Bank Group: Private Sector and Infrastructure
Network Note number 261, May.
Veenhoven, R. (1991) “Questions on happiness: classical topics, modern
answers, blind spots,” in: Strack, F., Argyle, M., Schwarz, N. (eds),
Subjective Well-being, Pergamon Press, Oxford.
16

Appendix
Population of 100,000 is assumed. Social cost of healthcare for the
unfortunate in a year assumed to be $100,000 that for the fortunate $10,000
(10 being the “Misfortune Multiple”). Individuals pay full direct costs of
care up to the cap under Excessive Burden Insurance. “Risk ratio” is
defined as Maximum Cost to Individual divided by Minimum Cost to
Individual. Expected cost = Sum of Minimum Cost and Maximum Cost
weighted by probabilities. “Premiums” are the amounts needed to fund
the insurance program, ignoring administrative costs. Table 1 shows that
the risk ratio is less than 2 for annual deductibles of $20,000 under
Excessive Burden Insurance. Table 2 shows that if the risk ratio is to be
reduced to less than 2 under Fee-Reducing Insurance, the fee reduction will
have be equal to a 90% discount. Moreover, at 100% discount (i.e., no
charges at all), stakes under FRI would be identical with stakes under EBI
with an annual cap at $10,000. Given human nature as it is, this is likely
to reduce preventive care and cause serious moral hazard problems.
Appendix Table 1: Excessive Burden Insurance when misfortune multiple = 10 and probability
of misfortune = 1%
Amount of
Charges
Charges
Minimum Maximum Individual’s
Annual
paid by Premium Individual Individual Expected
Risk
Deductible D paid by
( The “Cap”) fortunate unfortunate Required Pays
Pays
Cost
Ratio
(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)=(f)/(e)

10000

10000

10000

900

10900

10900

10900

1.00

20000

10000

20000

800

10800

20800

10900

1.93

30000

10000

30000

700

10700

30700

10900

2.87

40000

10000

40000

600

10600

40600

10900

3.83

50000

10000

50000

500

10500

50500

10900

4.81

70000

10000

70000

400

10400

60400

10900

5.81

60000

10000

60000

300

10300

70300

10900

6.83

80000

10000

80000

200

10200

80200

10900

7.86

90000

10000

90000

100

10100

90100

10900

8.92

100000

10000

100000

0

10000

100000

10900

10.00

Note: “Premium Required” is calculated as total healthcare costs minus fees collected divided by the
population. Premiums are assumed to be collected in these examples but in practice may be
funded from the general revenue.
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Appendix Table 2: Fee Reducing Insurance when Misfortune Multiple = 10 and Probability of
Misfortune = 1%, assuming behavior is neutral, i.e., not affected by the high premiums.
Charges
Minimum Maximum Individual's
Discount Charges Paid
Premium Individual Individual Expected
Risk
Paid by
Factor d by Fortunate Unfortunate Required
Ratio
Pays
Pays
cost
(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)=(f)/(e)

10%

9000

90000

1090

10090

91090

10900

9.03

20%

8000

80000

2180

10180

82180

10900

8.07

30%

7000

70000

3270

10270

73270

10900

7.13

40%

6000

60000

4360

10360

64360

10900

6.21

50%

5000

50000

5450

10450

55450

10900

5.31

60%

4000

40000

6540

10540

46540

10900

4.42

70%

3000

30000

7630

10630

37630

10900

3.54

80%

2000

20000

8720

10720

28720

10900

2.68

90%

1000

10000

9810

10810

19810

10900

1.83

100%
0
0
10900
10900
10900
10900
1.00
Note: “Premium Required” is calculated as total healthcare costs minus fees collected divided by the
population.
Appendix Table 3: Healthcare Benefit-Age Profiles for 10 OECD Countries

Source: Hagist and Kotlikoff (2005), Table 2.
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